

RECENT POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN TURKISH POLITICS IN THE CONTEXT OF RADICALISATION

Turkey has been governed by Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP or 'the party' hereafter) for 17 years onwards. By four consecutive, nationwide landslide election victories, the AKP and its leader have had acquired an undisputed popular political credit almost never been given to any political movements since the republican inception. Progressively promising five fresh years, thanks to the EU perspective were quite fruitful. However, in ensuing four sophomore years reluctant democratic reforms have been followed. The third term was totally different. The political office welcomed the notorious but 'fairly used' life jacket of the Turkish politics after the 2010 constitutional amendment; nationalism, polished by populism. However, the worst years had to come. By the fourth term, after November 2015 elections, the party put the heavy-handed rules into circulation. These heavy-handed rules have turned into fully-fledged one-man despotism after the July 15th military putsch, still too much controversial regarding who the actors were. In this report both core and mundane nature of Turkish politics are going to be depicted under recent developments in a particular context: radicalization.

CONTEXTUALIZATION OF RADICALIZATION

The phenomenon called radicalization (which can also be used as fundamentalism) can be considered at three levels; consciousness, discourse and action. Regarding the manifest, high value of religion in Turkish society and the fact that religion is a fertile ground for radicalization in the AKP period, we can examine the topic mostly through religious lexicon.

Fundamentalists, in Islamic countries, build the political radicalization primarily at the level of consciousness and discourse. In most Islamic countries two chief practices of the radicals, blaming fellow citizens with their practices and interfering in their lives are quite evident. Islam, today, is a matter of identity rather than believing and practising what you believe. This is the radicalization conceptualized in this text. The basic working principle of a radicalized mind operates through fixation. A standard radical rationale involves obsession with a particular idea. This rationale brings an attitude of fixing the knowledge and fixing and categorizing the people with that particular knowledge. As eloquently put by Tamara Albertini in her path breaking article *The Seductiveness of Certainty*, the fixation process of knowledge is done over law-making which is quite complicated a matter. Classical Islamic theology for her; Qur'an and Hadith as sources of law, are logocentric and nomocentric subsequently. That is Qur'an itself is logocentric mostly with primacy of knowledge but also with some nomocentric ingredients. On the other hand, Hadith is mostly nomocentric with the very basic property of practice but with some less logocentric ingredients. That is, experience is not something fixed or totally submerged in rationality but mostly in daily matters. That is to say, such type of handling the sources can lead to "liberal" a law-making philosophy since it is related to life and practices: simply to say *ijma* (consensus), another basic source of law making. Recall that first and foremost important thing for being a Muslim is simply the belief (iman) in Allah. Law-making is quite technical an issue. In other words; law-making is not necessarily in the scope of belief. But for the radicals almost all things in life are offensively included in the field of belief, even growing beard and moustache.

CATEGORICAL AND JUVENILE ANTI-WEST DISCOURSE (with aggressive and abusive expressions)

It should be noted that one of the dominant problems in Turkish society is the categorical western antagonism, at least in rhetorical way. This rhetoric is used during the election campaigns by the politicians *par excellence*. However, current president Erdogan has the climax in this anti-West language. Despite being built on a teleology adopting Western values, this categorical opposition to the West in Turkish society stemmed mainly from three reasons. The first is to create an ideological level of consciousness by dealing with the history of the early Ottoman Empire. This consciousness

has been produced through the curriculum on the battles with the Western world. The second is the intense, unplanned and problematic migrations from the Balkans, partly from the Caucasus and the Middle East to the Anatolian peninsula during the transition from the empire to the Republic and the severe social problems caused by these migrations. It would not be wrong to call anti-Western trauma that emerges with these problems as 'post-imperial trauma'. The third reason of anti-West feelings deserves a new chapter to be written since it contains brand new anti-West *donnée* mushroomed during the last AKP rule. The AKP in its first term power was seemingly staunch a supporter of European Union policies to be adopted in Turkey. The legislative branch has strenuously worked for further integration with the Western world. In those years, these policies were severely criticized by intellectual circles. The focal point of the criticisms was about AKP's 'hidden agenda' concealed by pro-EU policies. AKP had started to break with the political rhetoric based on personal liberties on the basis of the European Union after the 2007 general elections commenced its own Islamist political ideological program with its social support. It should be noted that Islamist political ideologies have different shades in different countries. Olivier Roy's *The Failure of Political Islam* has abundant examples over the topic. The common problem of almost all political Islamist ideologies stems from a basic attitude; an effort to silence society in a top to bottom fashion through a political project, a typical example of political radicalization. Certainly, a number of discourses and memoirs ended by traumatic experiences that lie in social memory fuel this political radicalization. For example, the discourse of '21st century will be that of the Turks', a naive discourse quite much circulated by heart in Turkish public opinion after the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990s. The discourse was completely empty and fed the traumatic subconscious processes in Turkish society. The sensual concept, Islamic World; the Ummah, Muslims unified in mind; The Palestinian question and so forth have all been instrumentalized at discursive and policy level for AKP's ideological project. Anti-West colour was always evident in almost all ideological discourses of AKP leader and its cadres.

VIOLETION OF FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS

In violation of basic human rights Turkey has a notorious name in world's public opinion. Turkey, from time to time, especially during periods of good dialogue with the Western world, has taken certain steps towards improving the human rights. However, the fact that these developments were reversed in the following periods has always been one of the observed developments. The last three important periods of these improvements were seen after 1961, 1982 and 2002 extraordinary periods. However, a few years later, there were immediate back steps taken. After its coming to power in 2002, the AKP government undertook significant legal and practical developments in human rights. During this period, Erdogan shared the essence of the government's policy with the public opinion; 'zero tolerance to torture'. By progressive policies expanding freedoms, the AKP government reinforced its power with a much stronger popular support during the following election period (from 34% in 2002 to 47% in 2007). Despite some slowdowns following 2007 elections, reforms continued until 2010. However, following the corruption scandal that emerged in late 2013, a complete and sudden reversal of these policies took place. The radicalization that emerged in this period can be defined as political, ideological and religious extremism. Political radicalization emerged in the form of intimidation, suppression and even destruction of the opposition. Ideological radicalization has emerged in the form of making Islamist ideology a political choice of the state, while religious radicalization has emerged as an increase in hatred and hate speech towards other religions, but more importantly in eliminating moderate, tolerant and pro-liberal religious tendencies.

The most obvious indicator of political radicalization is the attacks on the Kurdish political movement, which tends to be liberalized and more importantly pluralized. Let us give a few examples of the

intimidation, suppression, destruction and monopolization of the Kurdish political movement in this period.

Turkey has completed the year 2014 with two important elections. These were the 2014 local elections and the 2014 Presidential elections. HDP, founded in 2012 by the Kurdish politicians by an open declaration of 'being a party of Turkey'. The policy of 'being a party of Turkey' has magnetized AKP leader's attention as long as HDP has a significant votes potential at every corner of Turkey among the Kurds. That was unacceptable by Erdogan since HDP could possibly get the Kurdish votes. On the other hand, the HDP co-chairman Selahattin Demirtas's candidacy for the 2014 Presidency has significantly split Erdogan's votes. In this election period, HDP's motto, "we will block your presidency" emerged as an important obstacle to Erdogan's policies. The BDP, another representative of the Kurdish political movement, achieved significant success in the 2014 local elections winning 10 mayor titles in 10 Kurdish-populated provinces. In addition, in other provinces where the Kurdish population is dense, it has received very close votes to its rival AKP. AKP leaders and cadres started to perceive the Kurdish political movement as an important problem for their political monopolization. As a result, they pursued two important policies of repression, intimidation and fear.

Coming to 2015 June general elections, the AKP has not been able to rule on its own for the first since 2002. The AKP and its later partner MHP have deliberately sabotaged formation of a coalition government. Concomitantly, there were severe violent incidents with around 400 total deaths still not have legally been effective and impartially investigated. The elections have been renewed in November 2015 under such circumstances and AKP won another landslide election victory by 10% unexpected rise. In predominantly Kurdish populated regions, a policy of violence and intimidation has been pursued towards November 2015 elections and lasted post-election period. In fact, the AKP leaders have publicly declared that as a result of these policies, the number of votes coming from the nationalist segment has increased. The most important of these incidents were the heavy military operations carried out in late 2015 and early 2016 in provinces where the Kurdish population was concentrated. Most of the voters in these provinces supported HDP in the elections. During this operation, some of the Kurdish provinces were destroyed, many people lost their lives and many people were imprisoned. As the curfew continued for a long time, hunger and thirst problems arose and cities were not supplied with electricity from time to time. The operation aimed at preventing the pluralization of the Kurdish political movement. Indeed, the HDP's party program, the pacific political discourse by the Kurdish politicians, and positive-humorous attitudes of the HDP leaders Selahattin Demirtas and Figen Yüksekdağ brought important liberal political expansions in Turkish political life. The eradication and control of these Kurdish liberal initiatives was one of the main political radicalization tendencies of the AKP. In fact, HDP co-chairmen Selahattin Demirtas and Figen Yüksekdağ, the liberal and non-violent young and new generation HDP deputies Idris Baluken, Çağlar Demirel, Nursel Aydoğan, Leyla Birlik, Selma Irmak, Ferhat Encü, Nursel Aydoğan, Abdullah Zeydan, Gülser Yıldırım was arrested and imprisoned after the 2016 coup attempt. Also, HDP deputies Tugba Hezer, Faysal Sariyildiz, Osman Baydemir, Leyla Zana, Besime Konca, Nursel Aydoğan, Ibrahim Ayhan, Ahmet Yıldırım were dismissed from the national parliament.

ISLAMIST IDEOLOGY AS THE TELEOLOGY OF THE STATE

One of the most important examples of ideological radicalization is the efforts to turn Islamist ideology into the basic teleology of the state. In fact, the ideological stance of AKP's founder Erdogan's first political views and the political movement from which he came from is known to the public. When Recep Tayyip Erdogan was the Mayor of Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality, Nilgün Cerrahoglu of Milliyet newspaper interviewed him on 14 July 1996 and he declared "Democracy is a tram, we go to where we go by it then we get off there" and "Democracy is not an aim but mere an instrument".

About four years later, in an interview published in Zaman Newspaper, known for its close proximity to the Gülen Movement, Eyüp Can reminded Erdogan of his words that democracy is mere an instrument. Erdogan told Can that he had changed his mind and believed in democracy. Upon Can's persistent questions, Erdogan angrily stated that he embraced democracy. Later, Zaman newspaper mocked about this 'change story' and suspicions about Erdogan were reported in Zaman Newspaper on February 5-6, 2010. Moreover, the founder of the political movement that Erdogan came from had always been politically eccentric. Necmettin Erbakan who schooled Erdogan and established the political movement The National Outlook, once stated 'Turkey will meet Adil Düzen (literally The Fair Order). A change is inevitable, but whether this change will be bloody or bloodless, hard or soft, the Turkish people will decide that'. His words reveal the view of democracy and pluralism in the movement's tradition. The fact that Erbakan's frequently had slammed the voters, who did not vote for him, believing in 'potato religion'. In this respect, Erdogan's belief in pluralist democracy has always been questioned owing to his political past. However, since 2000, the reformist wing in the movement developed a new discourse, left Erbakan's party and a new political movement emerged. Erdogan was the prominent figure of the new movement. Erdogan, during the establishment process, stressed that he hadn't been former Erdogan transformed his ideas towards believing in democracy. He succinctly expressed the so-called transformation: 'I took off the National Outlook shirt'. Good relations with the European Union after election victories, raising the bar of democracy, efforts to guarantee freedom of thought and expression, and subsequent democratization packages left the questioning of Erdogan's belief in democracy. However, after the 3rd general election victory (2011 general elections), Erdogan's attitude towards democracy changed rapidly by Arab Spring. His views influenced the Arab streets. However, Erdogan and his view of the Syrian civil war, brought about an important debate in Turkish public opinion. The sections of society in Turkey had their stances as parties in this debate. The developments in later months have sparked a sectarian debate among the Sunni vis-à-vis Shia in Turkey owing to AKP's stance towards the civil war in Syria. Subsequently, the AKP leader and the AKP cadres chose to be fully involved in these discussions. These discussions include the monitoring of student houses and the police-watching of girls' and boys' homes, frequent comments by AKP cadres on women's costumes and codes of conduct, the establishment of an Imam-Hatip school in each quarter and so on. In that context transformation policies have become fundamental political reflexes of the AKP leader and his close retinues clamping together. Then some political agitations and open assaults appeared. In the interim period between June 2015 and November 2015 elections, the ISIS militants detonated a bomb among anti-AKP protestors in front of the Ankara Train Station. 100 people lost their lives but the suspects were released after the first trial. The trucks carrying ammunition to ISIS in the beginning of 2014 were stopped by the prosecutor's office but the process leading to the expulsion of the prosecutor from the profession, treating the ISIS militants in the hospitals of border cities Hatay, Kilis and Gaziantep were interpreted as the explicit supports of the Erdogan administration for ISIS and radical Islam. To sum up, Syrian civil war has left and still leaving some unexpected and unprecedented effects on Turkish politics and in Turkish society. The ongoing debates substantially polarize the society.

Another pillar of ideological uniformization policies is the long-term and comprehensive protocols signed among the Ministry of National Education with a foundation (Ensar Foundation). The educational cooperation protocols are type of sharp drifts from from secular education system and accommodating a specific religious view and religious circle to the education system. Likewise, the educational foundations and student dormitories run by the Erdogan family and the municipalities', the Ministry of National Education and some other ministries' support in kind and cash emerge as examples of ideological radicalization fed by the privileges granted to a particular religious view.

Examples of discussions about student housing, religious commentary of the Gezi protests, (reading Gezi events as Shiite attempts), 'imam-hatipization' (mushrooming Imam-Hatip schools), efforts to raise cadres through foundations supported by ministries and municipalities, obvious privileges granted to a particular foundation (Ensar Foundation) within the national education system, reading of religion from a certain perspective and taking everyone else into this perspective, looking at everyone and every section with religious references, and considering religion as a means of cultural polarization can be determined as the basic parameters of this ideological radicalization.

Religious radicalization, on the other hand, emerged as both a rapid and complete reversal of the outlook on other religions, as well as extremely harsh and unlawful practices taken against liberal interpretations of Islam. AKP, when it came to power in 2002, took a democratic stance towards religious minorities, with a non-interference attitude towards the assets, educational rights and internal management of religious minority foundations. However, in the following period, not enough comforting practices were mentioned. Religious freedoms have always been the subject of bargaining. For example, the Greek community's attempts to open a clerical school have been futile and this issue has been dealt with through the bargaining of building a mosque in Athens. There has not been a sufficient improvement in the return of the previously confiscated property of religious minority foundations. Again, the AKP government chose to be constantly involved in the election of the patriarch of the Armenian community. In this sense, it aims to establish authoritarianism on religious beliefs which are purely a matter of conscience.

However, the fundamental pillar of religious radicalization was erected by the excessive political and totally unlawful practices against the liberal religious views and groups. AKP government with religious non-governmental organizations has always been a typical clientelism since the first years of the AKP government. The relationship between them is an obvious give and take. In this context, such a relationship with the Gülen Movement was continuously tried to be established as well but failed. The Gülen Movement is basically a structure that deals with education. Therefore, some of the people who grew up in Gülen Movement schools, in dormitories and private tutoring took part in the bureaucratic cadres of the state after their education. The mass size and effectiveness of this cadre has whet the AKP leader's appetite to constantly control and use these cadres. Indeed, the AKP leader often invited Gülen, living in self-exile in the United States, to Turkey in order to control him and subsequently the movement then to be sole a religious reference point. It is now well known that AKP leader Erdogan has made a continuous request from the pro-Gülen bureaucrats; condoning his and his close associates' corruptions, especially the corruption of 20 percent share of state tenders. The ever-increasing corruptions has led the judicial bureaucracy to take first action in 17th of December, 2013. For first few days after the 17th of December Erdogan kept silence and decided to wage a war against all the oppositional people under disguise of the 'parallel state' and FETÖ (literally, The Terrorist Organization of Fethullah) He labelled corruption cases against him a 'judicial coup'. The AKP leader said 'I gave anything what you want... (to the Gülen supporters)' This sentence can be completed as '...but you did not protect me.' The supporters of the Gülen movement remained neutral about AKP corruption and did not condone and did not protect him. In this context, everyone in the bureaucracy against the AKP started to be expelled, dismissed from office and even imprisoned on the grounds that they were in favour of the Gülen Movement. However, again, the reluctance of the bureaucracy to liquidate the Gülen Movement angered Erdogan. Then after the ominous coup attempt in July 2016 tortures, imprisonments, dismissals from the posts have been staged against all who opposes him. The extrajudicial punishment methods have been employed. In addition, all the institutions of the Gülen Movement were confiscated, almost everyone with the slightest connection with the movement was imprisoned, and those who did not go to jail or those who were released from prison were sentenced to hunger. In this sense, the Gülen Movement has been the victim of not obeying Erdogan's radical

religious ambitions (leader of the ummah, Chief (literally Reis, the Head), leader of the Muslim world, Caliph).

MONOPOLIZING THE POLITICAL FIELD

One of Erdogan's most radical attitudes are extreme anger, hatred and animosity towards the opposition. Erdogan constantly accuses his political opponents with a series of accusations such as treason, cooperation with foreign powers, supporting terrorism, damaging the integrity of the country, separatism and hostility to religion. Such accusations are now quite ordinary and part of his special political lexicon.

For example, in the process of renewing the Istanbul mayoral elections, PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan's red notice alerted brother appeared on State TV, TRT, which is under strict control of Erdogan, but he still repeatedly accused his political rival Ekrem İmamoğlu (CHP's candidate-mayor for İstanbul and now the mayor of İstanbul) with the thesis that he had cooperated with the PKK. In the same election process, he accused İmamoğlu of having a big trouble over İmamoğlu's noisy quarrel with a district governor, claiming that 'he (İmamoğlu) had a quarrel with my governor and cannot be mayor of İstanbul though could be elected as mayor of İstanbul. I believe the court will penalize him over that quarrel and I believe, he (İmamoğlu) is going to be dismissed by the court.' As abovementioned in different context in this article, HDP's co-chairpersons Selahattin Demirtaş and Figen Yüksekdağ and nine HDP deputies were imprisoned for political reasons without any serious accusations by extrajudicial ways. In addition, many HDP deputies were expelled from the parliament.

Aydın Ünal, one of Erdogan's close colleagues and his speech texts' writer, addressed Devlet Bahçeli, the leader of a political party (MHP); 'He will meticulously lick the mouth bubbles he makes when he speaks.'

It is possible to replicate these examples but we can talk about another unfair political race method. The AKP and its cadres use the material and physical resources of the state and municipalities in the election processes and spend public resources for their own political propaganda.

The new parties, which are planned to be established nowadays, are subject to heavy attacks by Erdogan and his colleagues. For instance, one of his close colleagues and once AKP's member of parliament Mehmet Metiner and Erdogan himself both threatened them 'we know how we call them to account'.

All of these examples should be taken into account with Erdogan's efforts to monopolize the political sphere and to build a one-man political system. The efforts of the Turkish political life to be controlled by such a person and colleagues indicate a radical blow in Turkish political life.

INTOLERANCE AGAINST ALL KINDS OF OPPOSITION

It can be understood from the general flow of this article that Erdogan and one of the cornerstones of the system he wants to build want to destroy any opposition. However, it is necessary to open a separate chapter on intolerance against all kinds of opposition.

Obedience in political Islamist literature is an important concept and a constant area of debate. The issue of obedience, particularly that of Sunni Islam, poses a big political culture problem in Muslim countries. Almost all political Islamist figures present disobedience as a great sin, religious figures give *fatwas* on this issue and frequently blame political rivals for committing sin and 'haram'. For example, Hayrettin Karaman, known to the public as the source of the *fatwa* of the ruling party, AKP. During the election campaign of Istanbul mayoralty, he wrote up an article that caused important debates in the

public. Karaman claimed that, 'it is not legitimate to support the enemies (political opponents) even though there is corruption in the political power (AKP power)'. Another religious figure named Cüppeli Ahmet, one of the prominent supporters of AKP power and 'fatwaist' (the *fatwa* giver), stated that; 'it is *haram* (sin) to vote for the CHP candidate Ekrem İmamoğlu in the election of Istanbul mayoralty. He claimed that he based his opinion on the thought of many Islamic scholars.

Journalists, as natural opposition in any system, got the heaviest scolding from the political power. Turkey is the country holding the greatest number of journalists in jail in the world right now. The Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) published the report of journalists in prison in 2018, announced that at least 251 journalists around the world are in jail for reasons related to their profession and 68 of them are imprisoned in Turkey. Reporters Without Borders organization has also reported that Turkey jailed very high number of journalists. All in all, opposition in political Islamic literature in Turkey is considered to be equivalent to blasphemy in religion and this view is one of the fundamental parameters of Islamic radicalism in Turkey.

ABSOLUTE CONTROL EFFORTS OVER THE JUDICIARY AND THE QUESTION OF MAGISTRATE JUDGESHIPS (in Turkish Sulh Ceza Hakimlikleri)

It seems that the protector of Erdogan's political regime, which is closed to all kinds of opposition, are the judges and the judiciary. Anyone who opposes Erdogan is potentially at risk of being silenced and imprisoned through the judiciary. Any type of opposition is heavily been charged with supporting terrorism, then incarcerated mostly without prosecution. At this point, there is a controversial statement Erdogan uttered at the end of 2013: 'I declare you (referring to the Gülen Movement) as a terrorist organization by two policemen and one public prosecutor' Erdogan expressed this statement in a secret meeting in August 2013 and appeared in neutral media such as BBC Turkish. It is not certain whether these words uttered by him but the establishment of the Magistrate Judgeship (in Turkish Sulh Ceza Hakimlikleri) and their functioning reveals that Erdogan perfectly abode by what he meant. Erdogan consistently complained about the judiciary during his first years of power and stated that the judiciary hindered the government's actions. Within the scope of the Magistrate Criminal Judiciary; to take the necessary decisions to be taken by the judge in the investigations carried out, to conduct the works and to examine the objections made against them. For example, search, capture, arrest warrant. In addition, the Magistrate Judge is also responsible for the execution of these procedures or in the case of redundancy in cases where there is a problem in the delay of the proceedings to be carried out in the investigation phase according to the exception clause in art.163 article of CMK (Turkish Penal Code). The Magistrate Judgeships often faced criticisms because they were considered to be contrary to the Principles of Natural Justice "termed as Legal Judge or Ordinary Judge". Particularly, shortly after its establishment, arrests and jailing of several policemen without prosecution in the sahour time (lunch time in Holy Ramadan) on the allegations of "Parallel Structure" were severely been criticized for violating Principles of Natural Justice. In other words, the 'legal activity The Magistrate Judgeships gives the impression that they were established with a special purpose, extrajudicial initiation, for the Gülen Movement.

We have mentioned that Erdogan has a long history of efforts to control the judiciary. As a matter of fact, Erdogan has continuously used a series of measures such as filing a lawsuit against almost all the opposition groups, threatening journalists who criticize him, and imposing heavy fines through legal means on the journalists who draw his cartoons. There are hundreds of examples of political control over the judiciary. The American Pastor Andrew Brunson incident, which the world's public is well aware of, can be understood how strong Erdogan's absolute dominance over the judiciary is. Pastor Brunson was accused of being close to the Gülen Movement and spying. The Erdogan administration held Brunson as a prisoner for a long time. The issue of whether Brunson would be used to trade with

Gülen, who is self-exiled in Pennsylvania, or if he wanted to be traded with Reza Zarrab, has always occupied the mind of Turkish public. These swap allegations, especially took place several times in media (literally Pool Media, a.k.a. gutter press) which are under the absolute control of Erdogan. This gutter press has always boasted about 'how Erdogan's policy of hostage is so dexterous'. As a matter of fact, Erdogan himself openly declared in a speech emphasizing that Brunson was part of a hostage diplomacy. Alluding to Gülen, Erdogan called the US; 'You have a priest (priest is papaz in Turkish, and it is commonly used as a type of cuss word and Erdogan used it as cuss word as well regarding the context of the speech). Just give that priest to us and take your own priest. Here, Erdogan stressed two things: First, the judiciary is under his control. He expressed 'We are ready to make its thing in the court'. Albeit may not be understandable for a foreigner, what is 'its thing' and 'what is to be made in court' were clear to the Turkish public opinion and to his voters. Sure, his supporters boasted about how Erdogan is able and keeping 'the priest (papaz as a cuss word) for trade deal. Second, Erdogan aimed to please his own radicalized base by keeping an American priest (pastor) as captive. This is a typical contradiction and unsustainability of political radicalization since any kind of radicalization has little or no connection with the truth and rationality: Neither Gülen is a priest nor a person could be guilty of being a Christian or a Christian priest.

CONCLUSIONS AND/OR RECOMMENDATIONS ON HOW POLITICAL RADICALIZATION IN TURKEY CAN BE REVERSED

1. First and foremost, the main fuelling power of the political radicalization is the newly adopted Cumhurbaşkanlığı Sistemi (so-called Presidential System) since it authorizes one-man with trivial responsibilities. In other words, constitutional checks and balance system is not well ordained. Besides, Turkish civil societal institutions are quite weak to respond in case the basics of democracy are violated. The system in that case simply empowering one-man authoritarianism. Thus, the former parliamentarism should be restored.

2. The legislative branch in the system should take much responsibilities. The legislative in Turkish political experience had generally followed the duty of law-making. However, one of the fundamental duties of the parliaments is checking out the functioning of the system. This duty has systematically been ignored. Owing to weak top to bottom coherence of the system, the parliament must take action against corrupt activities in the system. The parliament was quite apathetic especially in the last corruption scandals of 17-25 December 2013 and the judiciary was unable to shoulder responsibilities of judging the corrupt politicians.

3. The world public opinion should follow the nationalist-populist political discourse and speeches since they strengthen the base of stupid and ignorant and empty valour and arrogance especially towards the West and weakens the ties between the Turkish society and the realities. Turkish politicians should be warned upon such discourse in international meetings.

4. Turkey, has no good records even in basic human rights. Thus, she must continuously be followed by the international human rights organizations and international civil societal organizations. Sure, she must be penalized in case of violation of human rights and sanctions must be applied not only on Turkish state but especially on individual politicians and bureaucrats. Because of Turkish state's teleological proclivity torture and violation of human rights, the sanctions against the state do not stop violation of human rights and torture.

5. Turkey, despite so much discussions, has not democratically amended the Law of Political Parties and Law of Elections. These codes simply hinder pluralization of political ideas and subsequently political parties especially in predominantly Kurdish populated regions. Turkey should especially be warned by the EU about that crucial matter. In connection with this, anti-terror law must be amended

as well. Anti-Terror law should clearly be written regarding the recent events right after the 15th July coup attempt. One must recall that, 500.000 thousand people have been investigated, detained, tortured, jailed and upon totally baseless allegations. These people have been claimed to be the member of the so-called terrorist organization, FETÖ.

6. The international public opinion should support new political parties, newly established or to be established. The current political parties are quite away from curing the politics in Turkey.

7. International journalism/t organizations should pay much attention to Turkey. Today journalism is totally fake in Turkey regarding normal journalism standards. Erdogan's Turkey champions journalist jailing and frantically silences media outlets, even the social media, by various means.

8. Turkey is the party in many international human rights covenants including International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and The European Convention on Human Rights. However, today, even the basic human rights like right of life are severely violated in Turkey. The international community, primarily and essentially, The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), European Court of Human Rights-(ECHR) and The European Commission must take immediate actions towards Turkey regarding these violations.